I defend the following argument in this paper. Premise 1: Laws of nature are intrinsic to the universe. Premise 2: Humeanism maintains that laws of nature are extrinsic to the universe. Conclusion: Humeanism is false. This argument is inspired by John Hawthorne’s (2004) argument in “Humeans are out of their Minds”. My argument differs from his; Hawthorne focuses on Humean views of causation and how they interact with judgments about consciousness. He thinks Humeans are forced to treat certain mental properties (insofar as they involve causal features) as extrinsic to conscious minds. I do not discuss causation or consciousness here. I focus on Humean accounts of laws. I argue that Humean laws are extrinsic to the entire universe. As such, Humeans are not just out of their minds; they are out of this world. I aim to show that premises 1 and 2 are well-supported and that denying either of them comes at a cost. Nevertheless, some Humeans may prefer to reject 1 or 2 rather than give up Humeanism. Even if the Humean takes one of these routes, the argument above has philosophical import: it shows that Humeanism involves surprising commitments.

This is a chapter for the Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding. I discuss the relationship between identity criteria and ground. I also discuss whether and how to ground identity and distinctness facts. This is a draft. Comments welcome!

One conception of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) maintains that every fact is metaphysically explained. There are different ways to challenge this version of the PSR; one type of challenge involves pinpointing a specific set of facts that resist metaphysical explanation. Certain identity and distinctness facts seem to constitute such a set. For example, we can imagine a scenario in which we have two qualitatively identical spheres, Castor and Pollux. Castor is distinct from Pollux but it is unclear what could metaphysically explain this distinctness fact. In this paper, I argue that such identity and distinctness facts do not challenge the PSR. We can metaphysically explain them.

This paper offers an explanation of object identity and distinctness. It is tempting to try to distinguish objects on the basis of their possessing different qualitative features, where qualitative features are ones that do not involve identity. Yet, this criterion for object identity faces counterexamples: distinct objects can share all of their qualitative features. In order to distinguish objects we need to look not only at which properties and relations objects instantiate but also how they instantiate these properties and relations. I suggest that objects are identical when they stand in certain qualitative relations in virtue of their existence. An object that has a feature in virtue of its existence has that feature existentially. The proposal is that objects are identical when they stand in specific relations existentially. Objects are distinct if they do not stand in the same kinds of relations to one another in virtue of their existence; distinct objects stand in those relations non-existentially.

I discuss Bennett's characterization of the more fundamental than relation.

Anti-Humeans come in many varieties, but Anti-Humeans about laws are united in their opinion that laws must be something “over and above” the Humean mosaic. My aim is to defend Anti-Humean accounts of laws against Humean accounts. Here I argue that Anti-Humean accounts of laws are preferable to Humean accounts because Humean laws lack explanatory power.

This is a (weakly) opinionated survey paper. Identity and distinctness facts are ones like, "The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower", and "The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre." This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I explore some answers to this question.

I defend the following argument in this paper. Premise 1: Laws of nature are intrinsic to the universe. Premise 2: Humeanism maintains that laws of nature are extrinsic to the universe. Conclusion: Humeanism is false. This argument is inspired by John Hawthorne’s (2004) argument in “Humeans are out of their Minds”. My argument differs from his; Hawthorne focuses on Humean views of causation and how they interact with judgments about consciousness. He thinks Humeans are forced to treat certain mental properties (insofar as they involve causal features) as extrinsic to conscious minds. I do not discuss causation or consciousness here. I focus on Humean accounts of laws. I argue that Humean laws are extrinsic to the entire universe. As such, Humeans are not just out of their minds; they are out of this world. I aim to show that premises 1 and 2 are well-supported and that denying either of them comes at a cost. Nevertheless, some Humeans may prefer to reject 1 or 2 rather than give up Humeanism. Even if the Humean takes one of these routes, the argument above has philosophical import: it shows that Humeanism involves surprising commitments.

This is a chapter for the Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding. I discuss the relationship between identity criteria and ground. I also discuss whether and how to ground identity and distinctness facts. This is a draft. Comments welcome!

One conception of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) maintains that every fact is metaphysically explained. There are different ways to challenge this version of the PSR; one type of challenge involves pinpointing a specific set of facts that resist metaphysical explanation. Certain identity and distinctness facts seem to constitute such a set. For example, we can imagine a scenario in which we have two qualitatively identical spheres, Castor and Pollux. Castor is distinct from Pollux but it is unclear what could metaphysically explain this distinctness fact. In this paper, I argue that such identity and distinctness facts do not challenge the PSR. We can metaphysically explain them.

This paper offers an explanation of object identity and distinctness. It is tempting to try to distinguish objects on the basis of their possessing different qualitative features, where qualitative features are ones that do not involve identity. Yet, this criterion for object identity faces counterexamples: distinct objects can share all of their qualitative features. In order to distinguish objects we need to look not only at which properties and relations objects instantiate but also how they instantiate these properties and relations. I suggest that objects are identical when they stand in certain qualitative relations in virtue of their existence. An object that has a feature in virtue of its existence has that feature existentially. The proposal is that objects are identical when they stand in specific relations existentially. Objects are distinct if they do not stand in the same kinds of relations to one another in virtue of their existence; distinct objects stand in those relations non-existentially.

I discuss Bennett's characterization of the more fundamental than relation.

Anti-Humeans come in many varieties, but Anti-Humeans about laws are united in their opinion that laws must be something “over and above” the Humean mosaic. My aim is to defend Anti-Humean accounts of laws against Humean accounts. Here I argue that Anti-Humean accounts of laws are preferable to Humean accounts because Humean laws lack explanatory power.

This is a (weakly) opinionated survey paper. Identity and distinctness facts are ones like, "The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower", and "The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre." This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I explore some answers to this question.

I defend the following argument in this paper. Premise 1: Laws of nature are intrinsic to the universe. Premise 2: Humeanism maintains that laws of nature are extrinsic to the universe. Conclusion: Humeanism is false. This argument is inspired by John Hawthorne’s (2004) argument in “Humeans are out of their Minds”. My argument differs from his; Hawthorne focuses on Humean views of causation and how they interact with judgments about consciousness. He thinks Humeans are forced to treat certain mental properties (insofar as they involve causal features) as extrinsic to conscious minds. I do not discuss causation or consciousness here. I focus on Humean accounts of laws. I argue that Humean laws are extrinsic to the entire universe. As such, Humeans are not just out of their minds; they are out of this world. I aim to show that premises 1 and 2 are well-supported and that denying either of them comes at a cost. Nevertheless, some Humeans may prefer to reject 1 or 2 rather than give up Humeanism. Even if the Humean takes one of these routes, the argument above has philosophical import: it shows that Humeanism involves surprising commitments.

This is a chapter for the Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding. I discuss the relationship between identity criteria and ground. I also discuss whether and how to ground identity and distinctness facts. This is a draft. Comments welcome!

One conception of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) maintains that every fact is metaphysically explained. There are different ways to challenge this version of the PSR; one type of challenge involves pinpointing a specific set of facts that resist metaphysical explanation. Certain identity and distinctness facts seem to constitute such a set. For example, we can imagine a scenario in which we have two qualitatively identical spheres, Castor and Pollux. Castor is distinct from Pollux but it is unclear what could metaphysically explain this distinctness fact. In this paper, I argue that such identity and distinctness facts do not challenge the PSR. We can metaphysically explain them.

This paper offers an explanation of object identity and distinctness. It is tempting to try to distinguish objects on the basis of their possessing different qualitative features, where qualitative features are ones that do not involve identity. Yet, this criterion for object identity faces counterexamples: distinct objects can share all of their qualitative features. In order to distinguish objects we need to look not only at which properties and relations objects instantiate but also how they instantiate these properties and relations. I suggest that objects are identical when they stand in certain qualitative relations in virtue of their existence. An object that has a feature in virtue of its existence has that feature existentially. The proposal is that objects are identical when they stand in specific relations existentially. Objects are distinct if they do not stand in the same kinds of relations to one another in virtue of their existence; distinct objects stand in those relations non-existentially.

I discuss Bennett's characterization of the more fundamental than relation.

Anti-Humeans come in many varieties, but Anti-Humeans about laws are united in their opinion that laws must be something “over and above” the Humean mosaic. My aim is to defend Anti-Humean accounts of laws against Humean accounts. Here I argue that Anti-Humean accounts of laws are preferable to Humean accounts because Humean laws lack explanatory power.

This is a (weakly) opinionated survey paper. Identity and distinctness facts are ones like, "The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower", and "The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre." This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I explore some answers to this question.